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Abstract
It is observed in the real world that taxes matter for location decisions
and that multinationals shift profits by transfer pricing. The US and Canada
use so-called Formula Apportionment (FA) to tax corporate income, and the
EU is debating a switch from Separate Accounting (SA) to FA. This paper
develops a theoretical model that compares basic properties of FA to SA. The
focal point of the analysis is how changes in tax rates aﬀect capital formation,
input choice, and transfer pricing, as well as on spillovers on tax revenue in
other countries. The analysis shows that a move from SA to FA will not
eliminate such spillovers and will, in cases identified in the paper, actually
aggravate them.
JEL classification: F24, F36, H25, and H87
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1 Introduction
Does competition over mobile investments, shifty multinational profit, and fiscal
externalities across countries necessitate a transition from the most commonly used
system of corporate taxation, Separate Accounting (SA), to Formula Apportionment
(FA), the type of corporate tax system used in federal countries such as the U.S. and
Canada?1 One answer to this question is provided by the European Commission
(Commission 2001a,b), which recommends a transition from SA to FA taxation in
order to level the playing field for business competition within the European Union.
This recommendation is also in line with the advice given by several prominent
economists, who have advocated the FA system on the grounds that it is more
robust to the fiscal externalities created by competition over investment and profit,
as well as issues concerning double taxation.2
This paper argues against the above presumption in favor of Formula Appor-
tionment by comparing it to Separate Accounting. The central idea behind an FA
system is that a corporation should consolidate the income of its aﬃliates into a
single measure of taxable (global) income, which is then allocated among jurisdic-
tions according to a common formula reflecting the corporate group’s activity within
each jurisdiction. In contrast, under a SA system each individual country computes
the income generated by firms located within its jurisdiction (which can be entities
of multinationals) using arm’s length prices on intra-firm transactions, and subse-
quently applies the national tax rate to it.3 A significant diﬀerence between the
1For an extensive outline of the FA system in Canada and the U.S. see Weiner (1998).
2Advocates for a transition from SA to FA are among others Musgrave (1973), Bird and Brean
(1986), McLure (1989), Bucks and Mazerov (1993) and Shackelford and Slemrod (1998).
3A simple example may illlustrate the workings of Separate Accounting and Formula Appor-
tionment. Consider a Finnish company that has its sole subsidiary in Sweden. The entity in
Finland employs 70 pct. of total capital and stands for 70 pct. of total payroll, but has only 40
pct. of total sales, the remainder registered by the Swedish entity. Under SA, the company would
compute the income of each of its two entities (using Finnish and Swedish tax law, respectively) for
separate taxation in Finland and Sweden. Under FA with equal weight (1/3) assigned to relative
capital, relative payroll and relative sales, the company would first compute total income in the
two entities, whence 60 pct. (= 13 (0.7) +
1
3 (0.7) +
1
3 (0.4)) of it would be allocated for taxation in
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two tax principles, therefore, is that the SA system is based on reported income
whilst taxation under the FA system is based on reported activity. We show that
these fundamental characteristics introduce diﬀerent tax spillovers across countries
under the two tax systems which makes it impossible to unambiguously favor one
system over the other. In particular, we show that the relative strength of tax
spillovers under the two regimes depends on (a) how costly it is for MNEs to un-
dertake transfer pricing, and (b) how much pure profit the MNEs generate. These
considerations also determine whether SA or FA implies the higher level of tax in a
non-cooperative equilibrium, and in the end which of the two schemes is preferable
from an international perspective.
These results are brought forth using a framework with two countries embedded
in a larger world economy. The model portrays multinationals (MNEs) with a parent
firm in one country and a subsidiary in the other. These MNEs produce an output
using a common input and (plant-specific) capital. The common input is acquired
by the parent company and made available also to the subsidiary at a (transfer)
price. Under simplifying assumptions concerning symmetry we derive the eﬀects of
corporate income tax increases on the choice of capital and common inputs, as well
as on transfer pricing. Of special interest is how an increase in the corporate tax
in one country aﬀects capital stocks on the part of firms in the other country. This
information is then used to derive how the tax increase aﬀects tax revenue in the
other country and hence the character of the spillovers of tax policy.
A main issue is whether spillovers are more pronounced under SA than under
FA, and whether choosing one system or the other is likely to lead to too high or too
low rates of corporate income taxation in the two countries. We investigate these
issues in a situation in which countries can agree on the international tax principle,
i.e. SA or FA, but set their tax rates noncooperatively. The assumption that
countries can agree on tax principle, but not tax rates is in line with observations
of tax systems in the real world. Almost all countries have chosen the SA system,
whilst only a handful of countries, all being federal in structure, uses the FA system.
Neither in countries using the SA system, nor in countries using the FA system, have
Finland, and 40 pct. in Sweden.
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capital income taxes been coordinated or harmonized. This is an observation that is
suggestive of focal point coordination of tax principle rather than of tax rates. The
lack of coordination of statutory capital tax rates may be explained by diﬀerences
among countries related to the need for tax revenue, preferences for distribution,
or the desire to use the tax system to attract investments (as indeed is the case
for tax havens). These diﬀerences in opinion among countries concerning tax rate
harmonization have been exemplified by the strong resistance among a wide range
of EU countries to capital tax rate coordination within the European Union.
Only a few studies exist which examine the mechanics and economic conse-
quences of taxation according to FA. McLure (1980) first demonstrated that formula
apportionment transforms the state corporate income tax into three separate taxes
on the factors in the apportionment formula. Accordingly, state authorities face in-
centives to modify the weights used in the formula in order to stimulate employment
and investment in their own state.4 Gordon and Wilson (1986) show that FA may
seriously distort producer prices if national tax bases are not harmonized interna-
tionally. They find, for example, that if allocation is mainly tied to capital formation
(or property), price distortions will diﬀer among firms, creating incentives for merg-
ers. When allocation is based on payroll taxes they identify opposite incentives in
that mergers among firms producing diﬀerent goods are discouraged. The tax sys-
tem in this case creates incentives for production to locate in low tax countries with
sales in high tax countries, and conversely. Finally, they show that in equilibrium
nations will choose ineﬃciently low tax rates. This latter result is analysed in detail
in a paper by Anand and Sansing (2000). They show that while the harmonised
apportionment rule will prevail as the cooperative solution to a game between two
states, a state can increase its welfare by deviating from this cooperative solution,
i.e. a typical Prisoner’s Dilemma situation.
Our paper diﬀers from those above in that it carries out a direct comparison
4Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) have empirically documented the negative externalities on other
states associated with changes in the weights of the apportionment formula. Their results provide
evidence for the superiority of a harmonised formula apportionment rule.
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of Separate Accounting and Formula Apportionment.5 The paper is structured as
follows. Section 2 sets up a simple model of a MNE operating in two countries.
In section 3 the properties of SA are derived, and in section 4 a similar analysis is
carried out for FA. Section 5 then provides a thorough comparison of SA and FA.
Section 6 demonstrates that similar results are obtained under welfare maximization
and under tax revenue maximization. Finally, we conclude in section 7.
2 The model
Consider two countries, A and B, that together form only a small part of the world.
Each country is the host of a multinational firm which owns a subsidiary in the other
country. The two multinationals are assumed to be symmetric in their structure.
For convenience, we will use capital (small) letters to denote the activities of the
firm which has its headquarters in country A(B) (to be called firm A and B, re-
spectively). Both MNEs produce a single good in each location using capital (K, k)
and a common input (S, s). The production structure of each aﬃliate of a MNE is
assumed to be the same. The price of the final good as well as the common input
is normalized to unity.6 The input is common in the sense that the parent firm’s
use of it does not diminish its use by the aﬃliate, and vice versa. Thus the input is
really a ”private public” good.7 The parent firm charges its aﬃliate a fee of (G, g)
per unit of the common input. The true price of the common input for each firm
is 1; however, the price charged by the parent may, for profit shifting purposes, be
above or below the true price of the input, i.e. the MNE engages in transfer pricing.
In principle, costs associated with transfer pricing can take the form of fines
when transfer pricing is detected by authorities, and resource costs associated with
hiring lawyers and accountants to defend the chosen transfer prices. Here we shall
5A direct comparison of the two tax systems is also the theme in Nielsen et al. (2003) who
compare transfer prices when product markets are characterised by imperfect competition.
6In other words, these input and output markets are for simplicity taken to be perfectly com-
petitive.
7Examples of common inputs could be headquarter services, management expertise, or R&D
activities.
5
take the first route; the second is explored in the Appendix, and it yields equivalent
results. Referring to the symmetry of the two MNEs and their aﬃliates, we only
need to describe firm A in detail in what follows. Transfer pricing has the potential
to lower taxes for MNEs, but it is not costless.
Accordingly, transfer pricing involves the probability of a fine (z) set by the
country which is cheated against, i.e. the high tax country. Throughout the article
we shall, with no loss of generality, assume that country B is the high tax country
(with a tax rate as least as high as country A’s). The probability of being detected
for transfer pricing is taken to be a convex function of the deviation of the transfer
price from its true value, that is, the probability of detection is given by p(G− 1),
with p(0) = p0(0) = 0, p > 0 (for G 6= 1), p00 > 0.8 If detected, the fine z is levied on
the size of the shipment (S) times the overpricing (G− 1), times the high tax rate
(tB), i.e., altogether zS(G−1)tB. The expected cost of transfer pricing abuse is thus
the product of the detection probability and the fine. We can write this product as
zStBΦ, where the Φ function contains both the degree of abuse (G− 1) as well as
the probability of detection p, so that Φ = (G− 1)p. Note that zStBΦ includes the
evaded tax, so that z is at least unity.
If tax authorities in country B detect transfer pricing and adjust taxable income
of the MNE in B, it is possible that the authorities in country A undertake a corre-
sponding correction of the MNE’s taxable income there. The extent to which this is
expected to happen is indicated by x which lies between zero and one. The expected
addition to profits of the entity in country A associated with this corresponding cor-
rection is then xStAΦ, tA being country A’s tax rate.
Let R be the world rental rate of capital.9 Since prices are normalized to unity,
we have that pre-tax profits of the firm with headquarters in A and subsidiary in B
are, respectively
ΠA = F (KA, S) + (G− 1)S −RKA + xStAΦ. (1)
ΠB = F (KB, S)−GS −RKB − zStBΦ. (2)
8Note that the above assumptions imply that p0 > 0 when G > 1 and p0 < 0 when G < 1.
9Investment in the two entities for simplicity is financed exclusively by equity, where the required
return is the world rental rate of capital, R.
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Note that F represents the common production structure of the two entities. If
the governments in countries A and B tax the MNE, they can do so by either
using separate accounting or formula apportionment. We start by looking at the
implications of the former principle.
3 Separate Accounting (SA)
Most countries use SA to determine profits of a MNE. An aﬃliate of a MNE is
subject to taxation in the jurisdiction of location, if the aﬃliate is a separate and
independent entity. In that case, taxable profits are derived from the firm’s books,
with the exception of the possible use of an arm’s length standard to correct for
the value attached to intra-firm trade. This means that if the price used by the
MNE on its intra-firm transactions does not correspond to the price that would
have occurred, had the parties been truly independent entities, then the transaction
may be revalued by the taxing authority.10
We assume that the rental price of capital and costs associated with transfer
pricing are not deductible from tax.11 Then global after-tax profits of the MNE are
10In practice it is very diﬃcult to find the correct transfer price, either because there may be no
comparable ’market’ price or because the cost structure of the exporting firm is private information
(thus making it diﬃcult to derive a ’synthetic’ price). If goods take on the character of intangibles,
problems become aggravated by the uniqueness of the good. In such cases authorities find it
especially diﬃcult to argue that the item has been either overinvoiced or underinvoiced, whence
the MNE may get away with a distorted transfer price when incurring some extra costs.
11A number of capital exporting countries give a tax credit upon repatriation for foreign taxes
paid. However, given the possibilities of deferral and the use of limited credits, it is generally agreed
that the source principle of taxation is eﬀectively in operation (see e.g. Tanzi and Bovenberg 1990,
and Keen 1993).
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under SA12
ΠSA = (1− tA) [F (KA, S) + (G− 1)S] (3)
+(1− tB) [F (KB, S)−GS]−RK − (ztB − xtA)StBΦ.
The MNE maximizes (3) by choosing its transfer price (G), its country specific
capital (Ki), and its use of the commoninput (S). Given the intangible nature of
the common input, the MNE can use its transfer price to shift profits between the
two countries. This does not mean that it shifts all profits to the low-tax country.
The reason is the (expected) costs that accrue under transfer pricing. Thus, at
the optimum, the headquarters of the MNE balance the marginal gains from profit
shifting against the costs, yielding a first order condition for G as follows,
∂ΠSA
∂G
= 0 =⇒ tB − tA = Φ0(ztB − xtA). (4)
The first order condition in (4) is easily interpreted; it equates the marginal benefits
of transfer pricing (i.e. the tax savings) to the marginal costs (i.e. the (net) fine).
It is easy to see that when tB = tA, then Φ0 = 0 and thus G = 1. Moreover, the
common input will be overinvoiced (G > 1), if tB > tA; in this case the transfer
price increases the firm’s costs in the high tax country and the firm’s income in the
low tax country.
The first order conditions for the use of inputs are:
∂ΠSA
∂Ki
= 0 =⇒ (1− ti)F i1 = R, i = A,B, (5)
∂ΠSA
∂S
= 0⇒ (1− tA)FA2 +(1− tB)FB2 = 1− tA−G (tB − tA)+(ztB−xtA)Φ, (6)
where ∂F/∂KA = FA1 (and similarly for KB and S).
The two first order conditions given by (5) have the usual interpretation of equat-
ing the after-tax marginal product of capital to the user cost of capital. Equation
12The two governments and the MNE are enganged in a two-stage game. At stage one the
governments choose tax rates non-cooperatively and at stage two the MNE chooses its use of
capital, public input, and the extent of transfer pricing. This section analyses the second-stage
decisions while the first-stage decisions are analysed in subsection 3.1.
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(6) equates the after-tax contribution of the public input to production to the net
of tax cost of using this input. The latter includes the costs and benefits of using
the input for profit shifting purposes.
Throughout the paper we will concentrate on the special case in which taxes
initially are equal (tA = tB = t). We will then examine the implications of a small
tax increase on the behaviour of the multinational firm. The assumption of identi-
cal taxes simplifies formulas considerably, while allowing us to derive some general
characteristics of corporate income taxation according to SA.
With identical tax rates at the outset, the incentive to shift profits by transfer
pricing vaporizes (see (4)), the marginal productivity of capital will be equalized
across countries, i.e. FA1 = F
B
1 (see (5)), and the common input is used only to
maximize global production, i.e. FA2 + F
B
2 = 1 (see (6)). Equal taxes (and an
identical production structure with a common input) also mean that the level of the
capital stock will be the same in each country. Under these circumstances, all first
and second derivatives of the production functions for the parent and the subsidiary
will be equal, whence we may dispense with superscripts for the remainder of this
section.
Total diﬀerentiation of first order conditions (4), (5) and (6) implies, together
with symmetry, the following responses in transfer prices, capital stocks and inputs
to changes in tax rates:
dG
dtA
= − 1
(z − x)tΦ00 < 0,
dG
dtB
=
1
(z − x)tΦ00 > 0, (7)
dKi
dti
=
F1(2F22F11 − F 212)
2(1− t)F11(F22F11 − F 212)
dKi
dtj
=
F1F
2
12
2(1− t)F11(F22F11 − F 212)
(8)
dS
dti
= − F1F12
2(1− t)(F22F11 − F 212)
where i, j = A,B, i 6= j, and where the production structure is assumed to imply
(F22F11 − F 212) > 0. As to the signs and relative sizes of these derivatives, we note
from (8) that
dKA
dtA
=
dKB
dtB
<
dKA
dtB
=
dKB
dtA
< 0,
dS
dti
< 0, i = A,B. (9)
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The inequalities in (7) show the direct eﬀect of a tax change on the transfer price:
if tA (tB) goes up, it becomes more (less) costly to overinvoice and the MNE now
wants to accumulate profits inB (A) by reducing (increasing) the transfer price. The
inequalities in (9) show that an increase in the tax rate of country i has a stronger
negative eﬀect on the capital stock of the firm in country i, but the cross-eﬀect
on capital in country j is also negative. Furthermore, a rise in the rate of tax in
either country leads to a fall in the use of the common input. To understand these
eﬀects note that an increase in country i’s tax directly raises the required before
tax marginal productivity of the capital stock in country i, and thus lowers the
stock of capital in that country. A reduced capital stock in country i decreases the
marginal productivity of the common input S, the use of which therefore likewise
is reduced. Less use of the common input in production in country j reduces the
marginal productivity of capital there, lowering the stock of capital employed.
Recall that as the MNE based in country B is a mirror image of firm A, all
the analysis above carries over to the former, with appropriate notational changes.
Thus, given the outline of the basic model and the comparative statics results, we
are now in a position to examine how taxes aﬀect national tax revenue. That is the
topic of the next subsection.
3.1 Tax spillovers under SA
Much of the discussion on taxation of multinationals has evolved around how na-
tional tax policy in one single country may impose externalities on other countries.
Here we investigate this question in further detail. The objective on the part of tax
authorities behind levying corporate income taxes may be to maximize some notion
of national welfare, or it may simply be to maximize revenue from the tax. In line
with a large literature in public finance, we initially assume revenue maximization.
In section 6, however, the objective is the maximization of welfare. We are able to
demonstrate there that under conditions of balanced ownership of MNEs, entirely
equivalent results can be obtained.
Taking into account both the parent company of firmA and the aﬃliate of firmB,
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countryA’s tax revenue is written as VA = tA [F (KA, S) + (G− 1)S + f(kA, s)− gs)]−
xtA(ΦS+φs). It consists of taxes on profits of the home-parent firm and the foreign-
subsidiary firm (the first term), minus the correction associated with country B’s
transfer-pricing penalties of both firms (the second term). Under revenue maximiza-
tion, a marginal change in the tax rate of country B, say, changes tax revenue in
country A as follows (starting from the initial equilibrium with equal tax rates)13,
dVA
dtB
= 2tA
∙
F1
dKA
dtB
+ S
dG
dtB
¸
, (10)
Having shown that dKA/dtB < 0 and dG/dtB > 0, we may state:
Proposition 1 Starting from the symmetric tax equilibrium, an increase in the tax
rate of country B has an ambiguous eﬀect on tax revenue in country A.
To explain the intuition behind the proposition it suﬃces to focus on the MNE
based in country A. An increase in tB leads the MNE to raise its transfer price
(dG/dtB > 0, see (7)). This has the eﬀect of moving some profits from the subsidiary
to the parent company, thus raising the tax base in country A (i.e. a positive
externality). At the same time, however, the term dKA/dtB is negative, see (9). It
represents the eﬀect on production capacity in country A of a change in tB. This
spillover is obviously negative, and it is numerically greater, the greater is F12, and
the smaller is F11, i.e. the more cooperative the two production factors (capital
and the common input) are, and the less concave the production structure is. In
fact, the size of this negative spillover is completely governed by properties of the
production structure.
Note that the fiscal externality that pertains to the widening of the tax base will,
other things equal, lead to too low tax rates in the tax equilibrium since neither
country takes this eﬀect into account. In contrast, overlooking the negative spillover
eﬀect makes authorities impose a too high tax, ceteris paribus. Whether tax rates
will be set too low or too high in equilibrium then will depend on the relative
magnitudes of these eﬀects.
13A more detailed derivation of (10), which heavily exploits the symmetry of our framework, is
given in the Appendix.
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3.1.1 A Cobb-Douglas example
In order to gain more intuition for formulas here and in subsequent sections we shall
repeatedly consider a Cobb-Douglas example.
Specifically, assume that the production function F (.) is Cobb-Douglas and given
by F (K,S) = KαSβDγ, with γ = 1−α−β. The term Dγ can be interpreted as just
a constant, in which case we deal with a production structure featuring decreasing
returns to scale, or alternatively as the contribution from a suppressed third factor
of production D (which could be land, firm-specific management, etc.). In what
follows we shall allude to the latter interpretation of the term.
With the Cobb-Douglas production structure, the expression in (10) becomes
dVA
dtB
= 2βFt
∙
2
(z − x)tΦ00 −
α2
2(1− t)γ(1− α)
¸
(11)
From (11) it is seen that the cross-eﬀect on revenue in country A from a tax increase
in B becomes positive for a very low value of (z−x)tΦ00, which is the unit expected
cost of transfer-pricing abuse. If transfer pricing is virtually costless, the tax increase
under consideration will induce a large shift of taxable income from country B to
country A and hence make for a positive revenue externality. At the other extreme,
if (z − x)tΦ00 is very high, transfer pricing will not be used. But the tax increase
will lower the use of the common input and of capital in both entities of the MNE;
this will lower taxable income in country A and thus render the revenue externality
negative. Further, a low value of γ, indicating that the hidden factor of production
(or rents) is unimportant, will make capital employment extremely sensitive; in this
situation, the tax increase in B sharply reduces capital use in A and hence tax
revenue there.
Finally, we note that the cross-eﬀect on revenue is proportional to the factor
share of the common input β. Hence, the less important is the common input, the
smaller is the net revenue externality under SA.
Summing up, the net tax spillover under SA depends on the relative magnitudes
of a positive and a negative externality that arise if one country increases its tax
rate. In the Nash equilibrium, tax rates may therefore be either too low or too high
depending on the relative strengths of these two eﬀects.
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4 Formula Apportionment (FA)
In this section we consider the implications of corporate income taxation following
Formula Apportionment (FA) as an alternative to Separate Accounting.
In allocating a share of a multinational enterprise’s global income to any specific
jurisdiction, FA may utilize information on the relative capital stock employed in
that jurisdiction, the relative sales there, and the relative payroll there. With a
broad formula with all three factors present, the eﬀects of tax policy would be
multi-faceted, in that the consequences for capital accumulation, employment and
sales would all have to be accounted for. However, the main thing is that the
average (weighted) tax burden will rise following a tax increase, and this is well
captured by a more narrow formula containing only one factor, say capital. Thus,
for simplicity we consider only a simple variant of FA, in which the capital stock
is the sole factor entering the sharing formula in the FA. We likewise assume that
the FA arrangement makes use of the same definition in both countries for the
multinational’s global taxable income; the rates chosen in the two countries may in
principle diﬀer, though.14
To explain the mechanics of FA we again rely on symmetry and focus on the
MNE based in country A. Under FA the before-tax profits on the part of its two
entities of the MNE are ΠA + ΠB, and taxable income in each country is divided
according to the capital stock in that country as a share of the MNE’s world-wide
capital. The MNE’s profit tax liability, Ti, in either country is thus
Ti = ti
Ki
K
[F (KA, S) + F (KB, S)− S]. (12)
After-tax profits are accordingly given by
ΠFA = (ΠA +ΠB)− TA − TB,
= (1− T )[F (KA, S) + F (KB, S)− S]−RK − (ztB − xtA)SΦ. (13)
14Observe that our simple formulation implies that the countries use the same formula appor-
tionment rule, and thus there already exists rule harmonization. Thus, our setup abstracts from
the issues examined in, e.g., Gordon and Wilson (1986) and Goolsbee and Maydew (2000), and
focuses on the issues that the EU proposal gives rise to.
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where T ≡ KA
K
tA +
KB
K
tB is the average eﬀective tax rate on the part of the MNE.
Note that the transfer price set by the multinational has no bearing on the definition
of the tax base for use in either country. Hence, in order to maximize after tax profits,
the MNE will wish to set G equal to its ’true’ value of one. Accordingly, transfer
pricing is not present under Formula Apportionment.15
To find the MNE’s choice of capital stocks and quantity of the common input
we derive the first order conditions for maximization of after-tax profits.16 The
conditions are:
∂ΠFA
∂Ki
= (1− T )F i1 − [F (KA, S) + F (KB, S)− S]
Kj
K2
(ti − tj)−R = 0, (14)
∂ΠFA
∂S
= (1− T )
£
FA2 + F
B
2 − 1
¤
− (ztB − xtA)Φ = 0 (15)
The first order conditions in (14) for the choice of capital stocks are more complicated
than under SA (compare with (5)), as they contain an extra term. A rise in, say,
KA, directly increases the (after-tax) marginal product of capital as well as the total
user cost of capital. In addition, it induces a change in the average tax rate which
will tend to fall, if tA < tB, raising the after-tax marginal contribution of capital
to profits. This eﬀect is captured by the second term on the right hand side of
(14). Since transfer pricing is not present and G = 1, the first order condition for
S becomes particularly simple here — FA2 + F
B
2 − 1 = 0 — i.e., the sum of marginal
productivities has to equal unity. No extra term reflecting costs and benefits of
transfer pricing (viz. (6)) appears.17
In the following we focus on the case of initially identical rates of tax (tA = tB = t
and hence t = T ). Totally diﬀerentiating the first order conditions we derive formulas
15To see this formally, derive the first order condition for G. The result is Φ0 = 0, which implies
that G = 1.
16Again, as in the SA case, there is a two-stage framework in the background. The decisions taken
at the second stage are presented here, while the decisions taken at the first stage are presented in
subsection 4.1.
17Note that with equal taxes the values entering the first order conditions for the MNE are the
same irrespectively of whether it operates under a SA or a FA regime. However, as we shall see,
the comparative statics results, and hence the externalities, are markedly diﬀerent in the two cases.
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for how capital stocks and common input choice are aﬀected by tax changes (a
fortiori assuming identical taxes at the outset),
dKi
dti
=
F1F22F11 + (F22F11 − F 212)(2F − S)/K
2(1− T )F11(F22F11 − F 212)
dKi
dtj
=
F1F22F11 − (F22F11 − F 212)(2F − S)/K
2(1− T )F11(F22F11 − F 212)
(16)
dS
dti
= − F1F12
2(1− T )(F22F11 − F 212)
From (16) we can conclude that
0 >
dKA
dtA
=
dKB
dtB
<
dKA
dtB
=
dKB
dtA
,
dS
dti
< 0, i = A,B. (17)
The inequalities in (17) relate that under SA, the eﬀect of a tax increase on the
MNE’s capital stock in the same country is negative. Diﬀerent from under SA, the
sign of the cross-eﬀect on capital employed in the other country is now ambiguous
(cf. (8)). This is seen from (16) by examining the numerator of dKi/dtj. It can then
be seen that the numerator may become negative if its second term dominates the
first. This will happen if the renumeration of suppressed production factors of the
MNE in the two countries (relative to the stock of capital), (2F − S)/K − F1, is
large, and if F12 as an indicator of how cooperative capital and the common input
are, is small.
The intuition for the ambiguity as to the cross-eﬀect on capital is as follows: On
one hand, the increase in the tax in country j raises the average eﬀective tax rate,
t. As overall capital now is more heavily taxed, its after-tax marginal productivity
falls, and this leads to a reduction in overall capital in both countries. On the other
hand, since the tax in country i is now smaller than that in country j, the average
eﬀective tax can be lowered through a relative increase in the capital stock in country
i, relative to that of country j. This is more attractive, the higher are pure profits
from production. If the second eﬀect dominates the first, the cross-eﬀect on capital
in country i of the tax increase in country j will be positive, and vice versa.
In the Cobb-Douglas example from section 3, dKi/dtj can be found to be pro-
portional to the expression [2γ − α(1 − α)], which clearly has an ambiguous sign.
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Again, however, if the share of rents, γ, is large, a positive cross-eﬀect on capital is
guaranteed.
From (8) and (16) we deduce that the eﬀect of a tax increase in any country on
the use of the common input is the same under FA and SA, and that the eﬀect of a
coordinated tax increase on the stock of capital in either country (or, alternatively,
the eﬀect of a tax increase in one of the two countries on total capital employed by
the MNE) likewise is the same under the two international tax regimes. Given our
symmetry assumptions, this is what we should expect.
4.1 Tax spillovers under FA
In a similar fashion as in the previous section we may now examine the eﬀect on tax
revenue in country A from a tax increase in country B.
Incorporating the subsidiary of the MNE based in country B, we define tax
revenues in country A as
VA = tA
KA
K
[F (KA, S) + F (KB, S)− S]+tA
kA
k
[f(kA, s) + f(kB, s)− s]−xtA(ΦS+φs),
i.e. the tax rate times the proportion of the home and of the foreign MNE’s global
profits that is apportioned to countryA according to the capital employed in country
A (the two first terms), minus the probability-contingent compensating correction for
transfer pricing for both firms (the third term). Under the assumption of symmetry,
the eﬀect on tax revenue in A from a marginal change in tB is then,18
dVA
dtB
= 2tA
"
(F (KA, S) + F (KB, S)− S)
Ã
KB
dKA
dtB
−KA dKBdtB
K2
!
+ F1
KA
K
dK
dtB
#
(18)
From (18), it follows directly that;
Proposition 2 The eﬀect of an increase in tB on tax revenue in country A is
ambiguous.
18The derivation of this is similar to the derivation for the Separate Accounting case which is
reported in the Appendix.
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Qualitatively, the result is the same as under SA. The reason for the ambiguity,
however, diﬀers. Formula (18) contains two eﬀects. The first is the direct fiscal
externality on A’s tax base from a change in tB. This eﬀect is positive. The rea-
son is that under FA - in contrast to the case of SA - the MNEs cannot use the
transfer price as a profit shifting device (see (13)). Instead, an increase in tB will
induce a relocation of capital to the country with the lower tax rate (i.e., country
A). However, the tax increase also makes it less attractive to invest in capital in
general. Hence, the global capital stock falls and thus also the tax base in country
A. Depending on which of the two eﬀects dominates, the cross-eﬀect on tax revenue
may be positive or negative. We can therefore conclude that, contrary to what many
analysts seem to believe, corporate taxation under FA will impose externalities on
other countries in a situation with multinational enterprises using common inputs,
but the externalities may on net be either negative or positive.
4.1.1 The Cobb-Douglas example
Using the same Cobb-Douglas function as before, the expression in (18) becomes
∂VA
∂tB
= 2tA
F (1− β)
2(1− t)
(1− β)γ − α2(1− α)
α(1− α)γ
Again we note that the smaller is the renumeration of the hidden factor (γ), the more
flexible is capital employment. A very small γ produces a large negative revenue
externality. A positive externality is also possible, however; this requires a large
factor share of the suppressed factor as compared to the factor share of capital.
This situation is tantamount to a large pure profit or rent in production. A tax
increase in country B results in a higher share of the MNEs’ taxable income being
assigned to country A via the relatively large decline in the capital stock of the
entity in B. This higher share implies a sharp increase in tax revenue, if there are
lots of profits from production. Finally, if the factor share of the common input is
small, then the revenue externality will be positive (and small).
To conclude, our discussion so far has shown that tax rates may be set too low
or too high even when FA is employed. The crucial issues are now: which system,
SA or FA, entails the stronger externalities associated with corporate taxation, and
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will noncooperative taxes under FA be higher or lower than those under SA? These
issues are confronted in the next section.
5 Comparisons of SA and FA
We compare first the eﬀects of increases in tax rates (from the same level) on capital
stocks at home and abroad under SA and FA. It is easily seen from (8) and (16)
that:
dKi
dti
¯¯¯¯
FA
<
dKi
dti
¯¯¯¯
SA
<
dKi
dtj
¯¯¯¯
SA
<
dKi
dtj
¯¯¯¯
FA
(19)
Hence, FA implies a more drastic cut in the capital stock in the country under-
taking a tax increase than does SA. On the other hand, the cross-eﬀect on capital
in the other country is milder under FA (and may, in fact, be positive under cir-
cumstances noted above). As we have noticed already from formulas (8) and (16),
the eﬀect of a tax increase in either country on the use of the public input is the
same under SA and FA. We therefore turn to a comparison of the cross-eﬀects on
tax revenue.
From (10) and (18), and using (8) and (16), we can derive
dVA
dtB
¯¯¯¯
FA
− ∂VA
dtB
¯¯¯¯
SA
= 2t
"
F1
2 −
¡
2F−S
K
¢2
2(1− t)F11
− S
(z − x)tΦ00
#
(20)
The diﬀerence between the cross-eﬀects on tax revenue under the two interna-
tional tax regimes is determined by, apart from the (common) tax rate, the two terms
in the parenthesis. The first term is positive, as both numerator19 and denominator
are negative, and represents the relative cost of distorting capital investment under
FA compared to SA in response to a marginal change in the tax rate in one country.
This term is greater, the greater are pure profits associated with production by the
MNE. The second term is negative, and it is numerically smaller the more significant
are costs associated with exploiting transfer pricing.
19Remember that (2F − S)/K − F1 > 0 can be interpreted as the overall remuneration of
suppressed production factors of the MNE in the two countries (relative to the stock of capital).
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Denoting the sum of tax revenues in the two countries by V , that is, V = VA+VB,
it is easy to see that
dV
dti
¯¯¯¯
SA
=
dV
dti
¯¯¯¯
FA
(21)
In other words, starting from the same uniform level of taxation, an increase in
the tax of either country will yield the same eﬀect on total tax revenue in the two
countries under SA and FA. So only the division of revenue changes diﬀers between
the two regimes. From this we conclude that
dVA
dtB
¯¯¯¯
FA
− dVA
dtB
¯¯¯¯
SA
< 0 if and only if
dVA
dtA
¯¯¯¯
FA
− dVA
dtA
¯¯¯¯
SA
> 0
(again, for the same levels of taxes under the two regimes). Thus, we have:
Proposition 3 At a given and uniform level of taxation in the two countries, the
cross-eﬀect (own-eﬀect) on tax revenue from a unilateral tax increase will be smaller
(larger) under Formula Apportionment than under Separate Accounting, if and only
if
F 21 −
¡
2F−S
K
¢2
2 (1− t)F11
<
S
(z − x)tΦ00 (22)
In words, the requirement is that there are only moderate pure profits (a low
relative remuneration of any hidden third factor of production), and that there are
only insignificant costs associated with exploiting transfer pricing. It is intuitive
that small transfer pricing costs lead to relatively small eﬀects on own tax revenue
under separate accounting, because here a tax increase implies a relatively drastic
cut in the tax base. Small pure profits also imply that the decrease in the share
assigned to the country raising its tax under FA will be only modest.
It follows from (22) that if the two tax principles were put on an equal footing, in
the sense that the problem of transfer pricing also vanished under SA (i.e., (z−x)tΦ00
approaches infinity), then a tax increase by country B will increase tax revenue in
country A by more under FA than SA. Put diﬀerently, in the absence of transfer
pricing, a unilateral tax increase creates a larger positive externality under FA than
SA.20
20A similar point is also made by Keen (1999).
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To make this point clearer, equation (22) can be rewritten for the case of the
Cobb-Douglas example of the previous sections as follows:
dVA
dtB
¯¯¯¯
FA
− dVA
dtB
¯¯¯¯
SA
= 2tF
∙
(1 + α− β)γ
2(1− t)(1− α)α −
2β
(z − x)tΦ00
¸
(23)
Very low marginal transfer pricing costs (i.e. very low (z − x)tΦ00) definitely
produce a greater revenue externality under SA, due to a large loss of tax base via
the MNE’s transfer pricing. Conversely, a very high (z − x)tΦ00 eliminates transfer
pricing as a threat and ensures that the larger revenue externality occurs under FA
instead. Equation (23) also shows when FA leads to the lowest revenue externality.
This occurs when γ is very low (i.e., a virtual absence of rents, and thus also little
incentive to move rents in response to tax changes). Finally, we may recapitulate
that if the common input disappears, there no longer is any revenue externality
under SA, whereas there still is a positive externality under FA.
Starting from zero taxes both countries enjoy positive increments in tax revenue
from marginally raising their tax rates. In order to maximize tax revenue they move
up the tax rate, until the marginal increase in revenue from doing so becomes equal
to zero. If at the rate of tax, where tax revenue is maximized under SA, it holds true
that the own eﬀect on revenue of a tax increase is smaller under SA than under FA,
then we can conclude that the non-cooperative level of taxation under SA will be
less than the non-cooperative level of taxation under FA. We state this observation
as
Proposition 4 The non-cooperative level of taxation under FA will exceed that un-
der SA, if and only if (22) holds.
To reiterate, this happens if it is not very costly for the MNE to engage in
transfer pricing (so that the threat of transfer pricing is a major consideration for
tax authorities under SA), and if the pure profits resulting from production are
modest.
Can anything be said about which international tax regime is preferable, and
when? To answer this question it is not suﬃcient to simply ascertain which of SA
and FA leads to the higher level of tax in the non-cooperative equilibrium. Instead
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we need to know which of the two regimes leads to the higher tax revenue in the two
countries (tax revenue maximization being the objective). In our simple symmetric
set up, tax revenue as a function of the common tax level is bound to be a well-
behaved concave function. On the basis of the level of tax under SA and FA, and
the relative size of cross-eﬀects on revenue, we can reveal some instances, in which
the SA scheme will dominate the FA scheme (or vice versa). Close inspection of
(10), (18), and (20) enables the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Starting from a non-cooperative tax equilibrium under Separate Ac-
counting, suﬃcient conditions for a move to Formula Apportionment to lower tax
revenue in both countries are either"
F1
2 −
¡
2F−S
K
¢2
2(1− t)F11
<
S
(z − x)tΦ00 ≤
F1
2F 212
2(1− t)F11(F22F11 − F 212)
#
or the same set of inequalities with the inequality signs reversed.
Proof. Using formulas (10), (18), and (20) we see that the two sets of inequalities
in the Proposition are the conditions for
dVA
dtB
¯¯¯¯
FA
<
dVA
dtB
¯¯¯¯
SA
≤ 0
respectively
dVA
dtB
¯¯¯¯
FA
>
dVA
dtB
¯¯¯¯
SA
≥ 0
Given that all terms are valued in the non-cooperative tax equilibrium under SA we
deduce that these two sets of inequalities correspond to
t∗ ≤ tSA < tFA
respectively
t∗ ≥ tSA > tFA
where t∗ is the cooperative level of corporate income tax (common to either tax
regime), and tSA, tFA are the non-cooperative tax levels in the two tax regimes.
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Due to the concavity of the tax revenue function it is clear that in these two
circumstances a move from SA to FA must produce tax rates even further away
from the cooperative level and so reduce tax revenue in both countries.21
The suﬃcient conditions for revenue reduction in the Proposition imply interme-
diary values for the marginal cost of exploiting transfer pricing on the part of the
MNE. Furthermore, a combination of very moderate pure profits and very coopera-
tive production factors (capital and common inputs), or the opposite combination of
significant pure profits and very uncooperative factors of production is required. In
accordance with intuition, cases with rather low costs associated with transfer pric-
ing are not covered by the Proposition, since in these cases SA would be expected
to entail rather low non-cooperative levels of tax and significant revenue increases
upon introduction of FA.
We may once more recall the Cobb-Douglas example from section 3. For that
example, the double inequality in Proposition 5 becomes equivalent to
4(1− t)α(1− α)β
(1 + α− β)γ > (z − x)tΦ
00 ≥ 4(1− t)(1− α)γ
α2
, (24)
(and the same set of inequalities with the inequality signs reversed). In words, a
combination of very low rents (small γ) plus intermediate marginal transfer pricing
costs ((z− x)tΦ00), or a combination of rather large profits and, again, intermediate
costs of transfer pricing, will guarantee that a switch from SA to FA will not be
desirable.
Logically, there will also be other circumstances in which a switch from SA to
FA will be unwarranted. These circumstances have the non-cooperative taxes under
SA and FA on either side of the cooperative level, with the taxes under SA closer
(in terms of revenue/welfare deviations) to the optimal levels than the FA taxes.
21The reason for having two sets of inequalities in the proposition is that tax revenue spillovers
can be either negative or positive. In the first case, negative revenue externalities, dVAdtB
¯¯¯
FA
<
dVA
dtB
¯¯¯
SA
≤ 0, imply that the cooperative solution lies below the non-cooperative one, t∗ ≤ tSA <
tFA. In the latter case, positive revenue externalities entail that the cooperative solution exceeds
the non-cooperative one, t∗ ≥ tSA > tFA.
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6 Welfare maximization as the objective
We now assume that the authorities of the two countries in the model aim at max-
imizing welfare in lieu of solely maximizing tax revenue. As this section shows,
provided that MNE’s are owned in a balanced fashion between the two countries,
we are able to derive results that are completely equivalent to the ones in the pre-
vious sections.
The country A-based MNE is now assumed to be owned in proportions a : (1−a)
in the two countries, that is, the fraction a of the shares in the MNE is possessed
by individuals living in country A. Vice versa, the B-based MNE is owned in the
proportions (1−a) : a in the two countries. The welfare — or social surplus — measure
is written as the sum of tax revenue, weighted by a (fixed) marginal cost of public
funds (MCPF), denoted by λ, and the part of MNE net profits accruing to domestic
residents. We shall assume that λ takes on the same value in both countries. Since
the price of the MNEs’ output is simply constant, there is no need to incorporate
consumers surplus in the welfare measure.
It should be pointed out that welfare maximization in this section does not take
into account any secondary eﬀects on the economy from increased capital investment
(increased capital investment, say, may spawn growth in other sectors). Accounting
for such eﬀects would necessitate a diﬀerent model (e.g. a model with back- or
forward linkages). In the present model, we have used the standard tax competition
model to shed light on a novel issue, viz. the shift from SA to FA. Including such
secondary eﬀects, however, should not lead to results in conflict with those in the
present framework.
6.1 Separate Accounting
Consider separate accounting first. Based on the definition of the social surplus
given above, we have:
WA = λVA + aΠSA + (1− a)πSA
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where VA and ΠSA,πSA are defined in section 3 (πSA is the B-based MNE’s after-tax
profits). We are especially interested in the cross-eﬀect on welfare, i.e. the eﬀect
of a tax increase in country B on social surplus in country A. Making use of the
envelope theorem, we get
dWA
dtB
= 2λtA
∙
FA1
dKA
dtB
+ S
dG
dtB
¸
− a[FB −GS]− (1− a)[fB + (g − 1)s] (25)
In (25), an increase in tB has two opposite eﬀects on the tax revenue in country A.
The capital stock in A is reduced, and that takes the tax base and tax revenue in
the same direction. On the other hand, the transfer price G is raised, increasing
tax revenue. The tax base of country A may therefore go up or down depending
on the relative magnitudes of these two eﬀects. In addition, the tax increase lowers
after-tax profits on the part of the MNEs, and to the extent that the companies are
owned by country A’s residents, this reduces social surplus. The latter third eﬀect
is new compared to the preceding analysis, and in isolation it decreases the chance
of a positive spillover on the relevant objective function in country A.
6.2 Formula Apportionment
Under FA, social surplus a fortiori is measured as
WA = λVA + aΠFA + (1− a)πFA
where now the definitions of VA and ΠFA,πFA are provided in section 4.
Defining T and τ the average eﬀective tax rates for the twoMNEs, and by making
heavy use of the envelope theorem we obtain
dWA
dtB
= 2λtA
"
(FA + FB − S)
KB
∂KA
∂tB +KA
∂KB
∂tB
K2
+ F1
KA
K
∂K
∂tB
#
−a(FA + FB − S) ∂T
∂tB
− (1− a)(fA + fB − s) ∂τ
∂tB
. (26)
As explained previously, the cross-eﬀect on tax revenue under FA is of ambiguous
sign, as it consists of a positive and a negative eﬀect. In addition, the tax in country
B increases the MNEs’ eﬀective average tax and thereby lowers after-tax profit
income received by shareholders in country A.
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6.3 Comparison of SA and FA
As tax policy in the two countries now has multiple aims, viz. obtaining tax revenue
and securing MNE profits for domestic citizens, the two countries will not choose
the same tax rate, unless they balance these two aims in the same way. For this
to occur the MNEs under consideration must be symmetrically owned in the two
countries.22 We shall in fact assume that a = 1/2. This assumption and identical
tax rates at the outset simplifies the two expressions for social surplus changes above
and renders a comparison between the two particularly simple. In fact, we easily
establish
dWA
dtB
¯¯¯¯
SA
>
dWA
dtB
¯¯¯¯
FA
iﬀ
dVA
dtB
¯¯¯¯
SA
>
dVA
dtB
¯¯¯¯
FA
(27)
Therefore, all our results in section 5 as to when the cross eﬀects (on revenue there,
on welfare here) under SA are higher than those under FA, etc., go through here with
no modifications. Full symmetry and balanced ownership is accordingly required for
the results for the relative size of tax spillovers to be equivalent under revenue
maximization and under maximization of welfare.23
7 Conclusions
With the spreading and increasing economic importance of multinational enterprises
(MNEs), and the well documented use of transfer pricing, the viability of today’s
corporate income tax system as relying on Separate Accounting (SA) has come
under pressure. Analysts, as well as the European Commission, are looking for an
alternative system of taxation which will limit the vulnerability of the corporate tax
system to MNEs’ movement of surpluses from high tax to low tax countries, without
introducing other serious problems.
22If, say, the MNEs were primarily owned in country A, this asymmetry would be reflected in
country B choosing a greater optimal rate of tax than country A, because it would attach a smaller
weight to profit flows and a higher relative weight to tax revenues.
23If common inputs flowed between entities of a MNE to the same extent, or if tax authorities
recognize the true price of common inputs as 1/2 on the basis that the inputs would be equally
used by MNE entities, then a could be allowed to take on any value between 0 and 1.
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One such candidate is the Formula Apportionment system as currently practiced
in, e.g., Canada and the US. The central idea of the FA is to assign, using a formula
based on the relative activity of the firm, a share of a MNE’s overall surplus to
each single jurisdiction, after which that jurisdiction can apply its own rate of tax
to that income share. Thus, instead of having a system where taxation is based on
reported profits, we could have a system where taxation is based on reported activity.
Clearly, the fact that activity is much less prone (to say the least) to mis-reportings
compared to profits makes Formula Apportionment an attractive alternative taxing
system. On the other hand, Formula Apportionment indirectly introduces taxes
on factors of production (as Gordon and Wilson, 1986, have shown) which distorts
the allocation of resources. Thus, the introduction of Formula Apportionment is
definitely not a panacea to the extensive transfer pricing problem of the current
Separate Accounting system.
In this paper we have given certain aspects of SA and FA a closer look. Specifi-
cally, we have studied the fiscal externalities operating under these tax systems, and
examined whether a shift from SA to FA could lead to higher non-cooperative taxes
and to higher welfare. We employed a symmetric model of two countries and MNEs
which operated entities in either country. Having characterized how the MNEs’ cap-
ital stock and use of a common input depended on corporate tax rates in the two
countries, we looked at the cross-eﬀects of a tax hike in one country on tax revenue
(or welfare) in the other. Comparing these under SA and FA we were finally able
to conclude: If the pure profits harvested by the MNE are either very low or very
high, and if the costs on the part of the MNE of engaging in transfer pricing are of
intermediate size, then a switch from SA to FA will for sure lower tax revenue (wel-
fare) in the two countries. There are additional circumstances in which the switch
will likewise be undesirable, but these are harder to identify, since non-cooperative
taxes will be too low under one regime and too high under the other. Finally, of
course, there are also conditions, under which FA will be preferable to SA.
From a policymaker’s point of view, the choice of tax system then relies on an
assessment of the magnitudes of (a) the costs for MNEs of engaging in transfer pric-
ing; and (b) the MNE pure profits. Indications of the size of costs of transfer pricing
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can be found in the literature. Transfer pricing is relatively easy for tax authorities
to prevent if the markets for the goods or assets sold are well functioning. In this
case there exist market prices for similar products that can be used to establish
true arm’s length prices on intra-firm transactions. However, with MNEs the assets
transferred are often highly specialized or intangible in nature (like technological
know-how). In such cases, accurate information on the true value of the good will
be exceedingly diﬃcult to find, and MNEs may have considerable discretion in set-
ting their transfer price. In such cases one would expect transfer pricing costs to
be low or of intermediate size. Further evidence on the costs of transfer pricing can
be found by considering the amount of tax-motivated transfer pricing undertaken.
There is substantial evidence of such behavior, and surveys of the literature are
provided by Gresik (2001) and Hines (1999). To sum up, it is quite realistic to think
of the costs of engaging in transfer pricing as low or of intermediate size.
The second condition needed to make a case for not departing with the SA
principle is that pure profits harvested by MNEs are either very low or very high.
The question is how large is the return to the fixed factor, that is in real life how
large is the return to MNE firm-specific assets related to technology know-how,
marketing etc. This is by no means an easy question to answer and will depend on a
concrete assessment of industries. If the return to such MNE-specific assets are only
of intermediate size, there is no clear case for either tax system from the perspective
of spillover eﬀects from taxation.
Concluding we would like to emphasize that our analysis should be seen as a
step towards better understanding of the consequences of a possible shift in the
system of international corporate taxation. Our results point to some factors of
relevance for political decisions and provide directions for empirical analysis to back
up these decisions. Needless to say, our analysis has in a sense focused on ’average’
or ’typical’ tax spillovers between countries applying either SA or FA, making heavy
use of symmetry assumptions. Some of the gravest problems associated with SA,
however, surely pertain to asymmetry, i.e. situations in which some countries would
prefer to be able to set rather high corporate taxes compared to other countries
and therefore find themselves especially vulnerable to MNE transfer pricing. It will
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certainly be interesting (but also very complicated, according to our preliminary
attempts) to examine the relative working of SA and FA in such asymmetric set
ups. For now, we shall have to leave this for future research.
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Appendix
Dervivation of the first order condition (10)
To prove (10), diﬀerentiate tax revenues in country A with respect to the tax in
country B to get:
dVA
dtB
= tA
∙
F1
dKA
dtB
+ F2
dS
dtB
+ (G− 1) dS
dtB
+ S
dG
dtB
+ f1
dkA
dtB
+ f2
ds
dtB
− g ds
dtB
− s dg
dtB
¸
−d(xtA(ΦS + φs))
dtB
.
Symmetry implies that S = s,G = g = 1, KA = kA, S = s, F1 = f1, F2 = f2, and
Φ = φ = Φ0 = φ0 = 0. On the basis of that, the second term above becomes zero
and the remaining term can be re-written as:
dVA
dtB
= tA
∙
2F1
dKA
dtB
+ 2S
dG
dtB
+ (F2 + f2 − 1)
dS
dtB
¸
,
where we have made use of the fact that dG
dtB
= − dg
dtB
. Since the third term equals
zero at equilibrium, the above equation reduces to equation (10) in the text.
The cost of Transfer pricing abuse
In this part of the appendix we explore a diﬀerent type of transfer pricing costs in
the form of resource costs. These costs may be interpreted as eﬀorts to conceal the
transfer pricing activity from national tax authorities, covering e.g. lawyers’ and
accountants’ salaries, and as such they represent a pure waste of resources in the
model.
1. Exogenous recourse cost: H (G− 1)
We start from the simplest possible cost, namely a resource costH (G− 1) which
is assumed to be a convex function, where H (0) = H 0 (0) = 0,H > 0 (for G 6= 1)
and H 00 > 0.24 Thus, if the price deviates from the true price of 1, firm A incurs
costs which are an increasing function of the deviation from the true price.
After tax profits are then equal to:
24This formulation was used in Kant (1988) and in Haufler and Schjelderup (2000).
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ΠSA = (1− tA) [F (KA, S) + (G− 1)S]
+ (1− tB) [F (KB, S)−GS]−RK −H (G− 1)
First order conditions become:
1. G: (tB − tA)S = H 0,
2. Ki: (1− ti)F i1 −R = 0,
3. S: (1− tA)FA2 + (1− tB)FB2 = 1− tA −G (tB − tA) .
Totally diﬀerentiating the first order condition for G gives:
dG = − S
H 00
dtA +
S
H 00
dtB +
tB − tA
H 00
dS
Thus, a change in a country’s tax will have a direct eﬀect and an indirect eﬀect on
the transfer price. For equal initial taxes, we get the same qualitative results as in
the paper, i.e. only the direct eﬀect mentioned above matters.
It can easily be shown that at this equal tax situation, the responses of the
optimal choices ofKi and S to tax changes deliver the same formula for the response
to tax rates as in (8), and (9) in the paper.
2. Transaction volume matters proportionally: SH(G− 1) or H(S(G− 1)).
In the first formulation (SH(G−1)) the cost of transfer pricing abuse is rendered
proportional to the size of the shipment between the two entities. The second
formulation (H(S(G− 1))) normalizes the cost of transfer pricing abuse by the size
of the shipment between the two entities of the MNE. In both cases the first order
conditions are:
1. G: tB − tA = H 0
2. Ki: (1− ti)F i1 −R = 0,
3. S: (1− tA)FA2 + (1− tB)FB2 = 1− tA −G (tB − tA) + (G− 1)H 0.
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Totally diﬀerentiating the FOC wrt. G and focusing on dG
dtA
gives:
dG
dtA
=
1
SH 00
− (G− 1) dS
dtA
Since H
00
is positive, the first term in the expression is negative. An increase in
country A’s tax directly leads to a lowering of the transfer price G so as to shift
profits out of that country. The second term has its sign depending on whether the
transfer price is below or above one (note that dS
dtA
< 0). If it is below, then the
term is negative, and vice versa. If G is below one, it must be because country B
is the low tax country. If tA is raised further, then as a direct eﬀect, G is reduced
even more. As an indirect eﬀect, any tax increase lowers the use of the input S, and
that in itself causes the cost of transfer pricing abuse to decline, allowing a further
deviation of G from one. In the situation sketched, the direct and the indirect eﬀect
on the transfer price go together. In the mirror image situation of G greater than
one, the indirect eﬀect would be positive, taking G even further away from one,
hence working against the negative direct eﬀect. Similarly, the eﬀect of a change
in country B’s tax on the transfer price consists of a positive direct eﬀect and a
negative (positive) indirect eﬀect, if, to begin with, country B is the low- (high-) tax
country.
However, starting from a situation of equal tax rates, the indirect eﬀect will
simply be zero (both H 0 and G− 1 will be equal to zero).
It can be shown that at this equal tax situation, the responses of the optimal
choices of Ki and S to tax changes deliver the same formula for the response to tax
rates as in (8), and (9) in the paper.
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